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1 Introduction
Global economy is interdependent. Policy actions taken in one country have spill over e¤ects in
other economies. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are common. Global, regional and national
organisations are involved in organising summits or high level meetings for policy coordination reg-
ularly (G7, G20, UN, EU, APEC, ASEAN, SAARC, ECOWAS, OPEC, BRICS, IMF,World Bank,
WTO are some examples). Both the demand and supply sides of emerging or developing countries
are a¤ected when advanced countries change scal, monetary and trade policies. Those economies
also are inuenced by policies adopted in emerging or developing countries. The macroeconomic
policy coordination models aim to explain the nature of such interactions and nd out strategic
solutions to deal with such problems. While interdependence among these economies are studied
using bargaining, signalling and mechanism designing concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative
games with complete or incomplete information among nations, households and rms at the mi-
cro level, or the multicounty or multi-region growth and global economy business cycle models at
macro level are applied to evaluate gains or losses of economies in the broader global economy.
Contributions in the policy coordination literature by Currie and Levine (1986), Marquez (1988)
Garnkel (1989) , Sheen (1992), Cooper et al. (1992), Levine and Brociner (1994) Chang (1997),
Goodfriend, King and Robert (1997), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), Hansen and Sargent (2003),
Evi (2004) Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Canzoneri et al. (2005) Bullard and Singh (2008) Kose ,
Otrok and Whiteman (2008), Conconi and Perroni (2009), Fratzscher (2009), Juillard and Villemot
(2011), Clerc, Dellas and Loisel (2011) Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013) have tried to measure
policy spillover e¤ects from one set of countries to others in the context of the evolving events in
the global economy. Picketty (2014) has studied implications of such interactions on growth and
inequality among nations.
The literature in the policy coordination can be divided into three generations according to the
impacts of policy coordination activities in partner economies1 . First generation models include
studies such as Kydland and Prescott (1977), Dri¢ l (1988), Currie and Levine (1986) and Obstfeld
1Kydland (1975) in his doctoral dissertation used di¤erential game theory in macroeconomic policy showed the
inferiority of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium compared to a cooperative solution. He interprets the policy
maker as the dominant player and the typical individual citizen as the non-dominant player. He shows (Kydland
(1977)) that in such a game with a dominant player the open loop control policy is time-inconsistent and attributes
it to lack of credibility. He also establishes that in order to get time consistency one must go for a feedback control
policy. Lucas (1976), and Kydland and Prescott (1977) are other papers on the same topic that use the concept of
rational expectations and argue for the advantage of rule-based policies to create rational expectations equilibrium
solution.
There is considerable literature on the interplay between monetary policy and scal policy and arguments are often
advanced for an independent monetary authority. One can apply the above di¤erential game framework with linear
di¤erential equation system with quadratic objective functions, and the monetary authority and the scal authority
being the two players of the game. It can then be argued that if the monetary authority is truly independent and if
one obtains the non-cooperative solution with each policy maker having his own objective function, the corresponding
Nash equilibrium is Pareto inferior to a cooperative solution. Using di¤erential games Petit established this result
for Italy (Petit (1989)).
There is a similarity between the policy coordination in European Monetary Union and that of states within a
country. The EMU has a common monetary policy and all the 19 member countries have their own scal policies.
There is a need to put restrictions on large decit spending by some of the countries as they will have serious adverse
repercussions otherwise on other countries. Now referring to a single country for a comparison, the states within a
country have their own scal policies with their own budgets and taxing powers, while they have a common scal
policy at the country level and a common monetary policy by an independent central bank. There seems to be a
need for scal policy coordination between the states of a country, such as need for such coordination between the
countries within EMU.
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and Rogo¤ (2000). These had found gains from coordination to be small. Lucas (1976) and
Kydland and Prescott (1977) used rational expectations and argued for the advantage of rule-
based policies to create rational expectations equilibrium solutions. Petit (1989) used di¤erential
games as did the studies of Obstfeld (1994), Sutherland (1996), Senay (1998), Martin and Rey
(2000). Obstfeld (2001) and Rogo¤ (2002) provide an excellent review of some of the models
used for policy coordination with Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush type models with little gains from
coordination. Aarle et.al.(2001) examine the impact of scal policies of member countries with
their own labor market distortions on the stability and growth of EMU. They identied the need
for coordination such as the stability and growth pact (SGP) that EMU had adopted earlier.
They use a di¤erential game, with Mundell-Fleming type model. Aarle et.al. (2002) examine the
coalition formation in EMU. Asymmetries in labor market rigidities and public infrastructure can
create di¤erent sorts of repercussions of common economic policies among states.
Second generation models of policy coordination analysis contained in Pappa (2004), Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2005), Clerc, Dellas and Loisel (2011), Juillard and Villemot (2011) and Goyal
(2007) nd pay o¤ from monetary and scal policy coordination to be bigger. These were extensions
of the post-Keynesian models in which micro foundations were added by assuming monopolistic com-
petition, nominal and real rigidities, individual representative agents with utility functions. But
they retained the short run dynamics and ignored the truly dynamic long run growth aspects. For
a review one may see Conzoneri et al.(2005).These models of macroeconomic policy coordination
introduce disequilibrium dynamics but they focus on short run dynamics or business uctuations.
They are devoid of capturing the medium and long term trends in the pursuit and evasion games
being played between nations. Supply and strategic modelling has much improved in recent lit-
erature on the policy coordination showing more gains from coordination as stated by Conzoneri
et. al.(2005), Evans and Hnatkovska (2007), Douglas and Laxton in dynare. Aarle et.al. (2002)
examine the coalition formation in the EMU. Then Kempf and von Thadden (2013), Dedola et al.
(2013) add asymmetric information and commitment where the welfare gains can be bigger as the
number of countries increase in such deals. Nordhous (2015) provides an excellent example on how
club membership requirement could be used as a coordination mechanism to control pollution to
mitigate global warming across nations.
Literature on international policy coordination dates back to the late 1960s and 70s. Then two
of the most noted studies done in this area were by Cooper (1969) and Hamada (1976). Cooper
(1969) examined economic policy formulation in an open economy by allowing international cap-
ital movements. The paper observed that with international capital movement and increase in
the interdependencies between the countries, e¤ectiveness of decentralized policies declines, and
coordination of policies between di¤erent countries becomes compelling. The paper assumed a two-
country model. He species the targets of economic policy as the level of unemployment and the
rate of economic growth. For instruments of economic policy he choses government expenditures
or open market operations, which were controlled by the nations economic authorities, and which
in turn inuenced the values taken by the target variables. The e¤ectiveness of policy formulation
was measured by the speed at which the target variables were restored to their target levels, in the
presence of interdependencies among countries.
Hamada (1976) used a game theoretic formulation to explain the same problem. Hamadas study
became the pioneering work in using economic policy games to explain the gains from coordina-
tion. Hamada (1976) highlighted the importance of monetary interdependencies between di¤erent
countries while examining the gains from policy coordination. He constructed an n-country game
in which the monetary policy of each country was conducted in such a way as to maximize the ob-
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jective function of its monetary authority, the primary objectives being price stability and balance
of payment equilibrium. In the process, he also shows that if there were di¤erences in national
preferences concerning ination and balance of payment policies, they a¤ect the realized outcome
of the world ination rate. Hamada (1979) extended a xed exchange rate case to the analysis for
exible exchange rate.
Cooper (1985) gives a detailed exposition of economic interdependence between di¤erent coun-
tries. He denes economic interdependence as a multidimensional economic transaction between
two countries, or a country and the rest of the world. Following Hamada, many studies were carried
out using multiple-country, macroeconomic policy games, with countries maximizing their respec-
tive welfare functions dening the strategic positions of the countries. Corden (1985) dened a
case of bilateral monopoly between two governments, whose objective functions were to manage
the aggregate nominal demand of its own country. Under exible exchange rate system he showed
that non-cooperative solutions will have deationary biases relative to cooperative policies. But
this remains valid only in the short run as it does not take into account the e¤ects of expectation
formation on ination and unemployment in the later periods. Most of these studies use static
macroeconomic models.
Other seminal studies on strategic policy coordination include Canzoneri and Gray (1985),
Currie and Levine (1985), Kehoe (1986), Ploeg (1988). In general these studies show that when
authorities ignore interdependence, the solutions will not be e¢ cient and conclude that when au-
thorities cooperate the result would be Pareto superior. While there are some studies suggesting
cooperation as a superior strategy, there are other studies which show that there are no clear bene-
ts of international cooperation. Studies like Oudiz and Sachs (1984) use a dynamic game model to
show possible time inconsistency in the solution. Thus they bring out the importance of credibility
of the policies of the players. Frankel and Rockett (1988) suggest that in order to maximize the
gains from cooperation, policymakers often come out with incorrect models of policy coordination.
This happens primarily because di¤erent governments subscribe to di¤erent economic philosophies.
Lack of knowledge of the true model leads to movement of the target variables in the wrong direction
and hence lowers equilibrium rates.
Obstfeld (2001) and Rogo¤ (2002) provide an excellent review of some of the models used for
policy coordination with Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush type models. These models invariably had
one spatial equilibrium condition for the output and another spatial equilibrium condition for the
prices, and one more for the capital ows or exchange rate. While Mundell-Fleming model is an open
economy IS-LMmodel Dornbusch included the assumption of sticky prices for wages, and introduced
disequilibrium dynamics into the model. This post Keynesian assumption was di¢ cult to uphold
among macroeconomists those days by anyone other than Dornbusch (see Rogo¤s Mundell-Fleming
lecture (Rogo¤ (2002)).
The nancial meltdown of September 2008 and the prolonged recession that followed in the EU
and USA raised concerns on the adverse impacts non-coopeeration and need for macroeconomic
policy coordination on bilateral and multilateral basis.
2 A strategic model for policy coordination
One of the major policy issues facing nations in a global economy today is to shield each country
from external shocks as such shocks can lower growth or cause ination. These shocks could arise
from uctuations in output growth, ination and domestic rate of interest. Such shocks could be
transmitted through trade in goods and services, international capital mobility etc. Some of these
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speculations or expectations arise due to long term trends as well as short run uctuations. The
existing literature was mostly limited to policy coordination between countries of EMU or between
the US and the UK, as in Frankel and Rockett (1986). The type of models to use, and the type of
problems one faces, will radically be di¤erent if the macroeconomic policy coordination is between
the US and China or between the US and India. The policy coordination in such cases must deal
with growth, investment, and distortions in both product and factor markets.
One may note the recent trends and the political dialogue between the USA and China regarding
devaluation of the Chinese currency. Likewise one may expect more trade in ICT services between
the US and India, and one may also expect trade in manufacturing with US shifting from China
to India. With these emerging trends the macroeconomic policy coordination between US and
China and US and India is not just for academic curiosity but is of great political and economic
signicance. Macroeconomic policy coordination in such cases must be strategic in nature and the
underlying models should incorporate both long run growth as well as short run uctuations and
must satisfy the following criteria:
1. It must have a model that captures the salient features of economies that are of interest to
policy makers, such as how output and prices are determined for traded and not traded goods,
and how the general price level is a weighted average of the prices of traded and non-traded
goods.
2. It must describe both the long term growth and short run uctuations.
3. It must address the issue of credibility of a policy in terms of its enforceability by having
transparency in model specication and its validity. There must also be a mechanism to share
information. There must be an ongoing continuous activity in each country for specifying,
estimating, testing, validating and improving the model.
4. The policies should evolve with time and be based on feedbacks from the model performance
from period to period; these must not be decided at the beginning of a policy dialogue and
frozen at those levels.
5. The model formulation must be such that the solution must be operationally computable
given an estimated dynamic model of macroeconomic interactions
6. There must be an institutional mechanism that will ensure the model assumptions are main-
tained that include data availability, common model, enforcing the adoption of cooperative
solution, imposition of penalties for departing from a coordinated policy.(Reorganization of
the existing multilateral policy coordination institutions such as the IMF and World Bank or
initiation of new institutions such as the BRICKS bank should follow from these monitoring).
The review of literature given above shows that the models existing in the literature on macro-
economic policy coordination requires updating to t into the evolving structural features of the
national economies. We establish connections and complementarity between time series economet-
ric models, such as Vector Auto Regression (VAR) models of the macro economies to the open
economy DSGE model. First we estimate, test and validate a VAR model and apply it to study
the impulses responses of shocks to aggregate demand and monetary policy between India and the
USA. Then we apply the two country global economy DSGE model to study the impact of demand
supply and policy side shocks in these two economies. These analysis t well in the context of
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the most recent Modi-Obama policy coordination debates of Fall 2014 and Winter 2015. Finally
we study interdependence among a set of emerging and advanced countries on growth in spirit of
the World Economic Forum in Davos in last 15 years. These time series and DSGE model based
analyses identify policy measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of shocks to technology,
aggregate demand and economic policies applicable in case of many other situations.
To motivate the policy coordination problem, let us consider three countries aiming for a policy
coordination with the Nash utility frontier (Nt) in which each country aims to maximise its own
utility (Ui;t):
Nt = U1;tU2;tU3;t (1)
Each receive utility from consuming products (yi;t) produced in each country:
Ui;t = F (y1;t;y2;t; y3;t) (2)
Let the supply process of goods be determined simultaneously as:
y1;t = 1;0 + 1;2y2;t + 1;3y3;t + 1;1y1;t 1 + 1;2y2;t 1 + 1;3y3;t 1 + e1;t (3)
y2;t = 2;0 + 2;1y1;t + 2;3y3;t + 2;1y1;t 1 + 2;2y2;t 1 + 2;3y3;t 1 + e2;t (4)
y3;t = 3;0 + 3;1y1;t + 3;2y2;t + 3;1y1;t 1 + 3;2y2;t 1 + 3;3y3;t 1 + e3;t (5)
solving this simultaneously:
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(6)
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In common meetings or summits policy makers decide policies given by 
1;0
; 
2;0
and 
3;0
but
each of them face idiosyncractic shocks e
1;t
; e
2;t
and e
3;t
.Then each country determines its action
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yi;ttaking account of actions taken by others yj;t and its own history. Such response patterns are
given by parameters 1;2 ; 1;3;2;1 ; 2;3 ; 3;1 ; 3;2 and shocks e1;t ; e2;tand e3;t : Each would like to get
more utility and this opens the opportunities for bargain and policy coordination. The optimal
solution of this game should fulll symmetric, e¢ cient, linear invariance and IIA properties of the
Nash bargaining game. This provides theoretical justication for using a VAR model for policy
coordination. We specify one such model to study the features of policy coordination between India
and the USA in the next section.
3 VAR model for domestic and foreign shocks to growth,
ination and interest rate policy
Let us begin empirical investigations of policy coordination model formulating a VAR(1) for the
USA and India, two large countries representing advanced and developing economies. They have
recently reinforced economic relations for growth and development including transfer of advanced
technologies, FDI and trade. In general a VAR (1) for endogenous variables Yt can be represented
as:
Yt = B
 1 0 +B 1 1Yt 1 +B 1"t (8)
The reduced form of this VAR system is then given by:
Yt = A0 +A1Yt 1 + et (9)
where A0 = B 1 0, A1 = B 1 1; et = B 1"t
Then select seven macro time series for this model as in the BVAR-DSGE formulation of the
two country global economy model in the next section. These variables are growth rates, ination
and interest rates in India and the USA and the change in the real exchange rates as shown below.
Yt =
2666666664
gus;t
us;t
rus;t
gI;t
I;t
rI;t
dt
3777777775
; Yt 1 =
2666666664
gus;t 1
us;t 1
rus;t 1
gI;t 1
I;t 1
rI;t 1
dt 1
3777777775
; "t =
2666666664
"us;gt
"us;t
"us;rt
"I;gt
"I;t
"I;rt
";rt
3777777775
(10)
This system is subject to shocks. The term "t = f"j;xtg is column vector of shocks for country
j and endogenous variable x at time t. Then the parameters B;  0 and  1 are as given by:
B 1 =
2666666664
b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16 b17
b21 b22 b23 b24 b25 b26 b27
b31 b32 b33 b34 b35 b36 b37
b41 b42 b43 b44 b45 b46 b47
b51 b52 b53 b54 b55 b56 b57
b61 b62 b63 b64 b65 b66 b67
b71 b72 b73 b74 b75 b76 b77
3777777775
 1
;  0 =
2666666664
b10
b20
b30
b40
b50
b60
b70
3777777775
;  1 =
2666666664
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
31 32 33 34 35 36 37
41 42 43 44 45 46 47
51 52 53 54 55 56 57
61 62 63 64 65 66 67
71 72 73 74 75 76 77
3777777775
This VAR(1) model is estimated in Eviews using the quarterly time series data of India and the
USA from 1981:1 to 2014:2 as given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Quarterly data series of US and India
Estimation of VAR (1) for above equations gives estimates of parameters and variance decom-
positions as presented in a table in the appendix. We impose structural restrictions for recursive
estimation for identication of the model, thus the reduced form error and structural errors become
related as: 2666666664
b11 0 0 0 0 0 0
b21 b22 0 0 0 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0 0 0 0
b41 b42 b43 b44 0 0 0
b51 b52 b53 b54 b55 0 0
b61 b62 b63 b64 b65 b66 0
b71 b72 b73 b74 b75 b76 b77
3777777775
 1 2666666664
"us;gt
"us;t
"us;rt
"I;gt
"I;t
"I;rt
";rt
3777777775
=
2666666664
eus;gt
eus;t
eus;rt
eI;gt
eI;t
eI;rt
e;rt
3777777775
(11)
Now let us focus on shocks to foreign and domestic demands and monetary policy on the basis
of responses to shocks as presented in Figures 2 to 5. Increase in the growth rate of the US causes
an increase in the interest rate and ination in the US. Higher interest rate triggers capital outow
and lowers the interest rate in India. US growth rate has very small impact on growth or ination
in India and has very insignicant impact on the real exchange rate.
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Figure 2: Impulses of aggregate demand shocks in the US
Higher growth rate in India does not impact on growth rates or ination signicantly in the US
but raises the US interest rate. This must also follow from the capital account channel. Increase in
growth rate in India promotes FDI to India from the US; outow of capital raises interest rate in
the short run in the US.
Figure 3: Impulses of aggregate demand shocks in India
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Figure 4: Impulses of monetary policy shocks in the US
Monetary policy shock in the form of higher interest rate in the USA induces more saving.
Given the productive potentials it raises investment and aggregate supply. Greater demand also
translates into higher ination. Higher growth rate in the US leads to a temporary increase in
output and ination in India. It also lowers the interest in India because of increased potential for
capital inows. The US monetary policy does not seem to have signicant impact on the exchange
rate of Indian Rupee.
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Figure 5: Impulses of policy shocks in India
Higher interest rate in India raises the cost of capital and lowers the growth rate but does not
have signicant impact on ination. This problem is further deteriorated because of appreciation
of Rupee which leads greater competitiveness of the US economy. Expansion in the US production
raises interest rates but has no signicant impact on ination. These estimations imply that capital
markets are more integrated than the goods markets. Higher interest rate in India allow raises the
interest in US.
4 Two country global economy model for macro policy co-
ordination
We adapt Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium global
economy model (DSGEGEM) in order to assess how the policy spillover e¤ects spread from an
advanced to an emerging economy or the other way round. It is a global dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model (also called new open economy model (NEOM)) in the sense that the
market in goods and factors clear at the global level - adjustment in domestic and foreign prices
and the real exchange rates make this happen. It is stochastic model as it focuses on business cycle
impacts of shocks to the technology as well as scal and monetary policy instruments.
4.0.1 Households
As is a standard in the most macroeconomic model households in this model receive utility from
consumption (Ct) and disutility from work (Nt). Discount factor () and expectation operator
(E0) are used to compute life time utility of representative households in each country (U0). The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution () measures the relative rate of risk aversion of consumers
between current and future consumptions.
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U0 = E0
264 1X
t=0
t
264
 eCt=Awt1 
1    Nt
375
375 (12)
Consumers are subject to habit persistent conditions as given by eCt = Ct   hCt 1; they also
benet from technological growth zt = AWtAWt 1 . Here  is the growth rate of technology in the
steady state and the habit parameter h is positive but less than one, 0 < h < 1: The composite
consumption good is made of (subscript H for home , the US in the current model) and foreign
(subscript F refers to India here) consumption goods CH;t and CF;t (the US and Indian) respectively
as:
Ct =

(1  ) 1 C
 1

H;t + 
1
C
 1

F;t
 
 1
(13)
Where  is the elasticity of substitution between the US and Indian consumption goods. Under
the new Keynesian supply assumption the demand for consumption goods are linked to home,
foreign and aggregate prices levels, PH;t; PF;t and Pt as:
CH;t = (1  )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct (14)
CF;t = (1  )

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct (15)
Similarly the aggregate price (Pt) is composite of home and foreign prices (PH;t and PF;t) as
Pt =
h
(1  )P  1H;t + 
1
P  1F;t
i 1
 1
(16)
Representative consumers spend on domestic and imported goods and purchase bonds (Dt)
from the income and endowment they possess. Budget constraint shows how the labour income
and receipts from bonds, net of taxes equals expenditure on home and foreign commodities and
expected value of bonds to be purchased, Et (Qt;t+1Dt+1).
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t + Et (Qt;t+1Dt+1) = WtNt +Dt   Tt (17)
Here Dt denotes the debt and Tt is the transfer that households receive. Then Qt;t+1 is the
price of bonds. The optimal choices of households regarding the commodity and asset markets are
given by the standard rst order conditions (FOC) as:
AWttPt = C
 
t   hEt

AWt
AWt+1
C t 1

(18)
This Euler equation (18) states relation between current and future e¤ective consumption where
t is the marginal utility of income, and  the elasticity of substitution between the current and
future consumptions.
Qt;t+1 = Et

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1

(19)
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The stochastic discount factor Qt;t+1 equals the discounted return on investment. This also
equals the market interest rate, that clears the capital (or the bond) market. This is the condition
for an optimal portfolio.
R 1 = Et

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1

(20)
Here R is the nominal interest rate implied by this system.
4.1 Firms
This model assumes a linear production function where output (YH;t (j)) is a function of techno-
logical progress at home and abroad (AWtAHt) and the labour input (Nt (j)):
YH;t (j) = AWtAHtNt (j) (21)
Firms operate under the monopolistic market and assume certain market power as given by:
Et
" 1X
t=T
t TH Q
t T
H YH;t (j)

PH;t (j)
t T
H   PH;tMCH;t

; MCH;t =
Wt
PH;t
#
(22)
Supply function for each commodity j is given by:
YH;t (j) =

PH;t (j)
PH;t
 !  
CH;t +GH;t + C

H;t

(23)
Where ! is the elasticity of substitution among domestic commodities. Real exchange rate
measures the degree of pass-through between domestic and foreign prices:
 F;t =
etPH;t
PF;t

(24)
The low of one price condition is satised when  F;t = 1: In each period some rms are able to
change prices and others stick to current prices as given by the Calvo pricing mechanism:
Et
" 1X
t=T
t TI Q
t T
T CF;t (j)

PF;t (j)
t T
I   etP F;t
#
(25)
CF;t = (1  )

PF;t
Pt
 !
Ct (26)
4.2 International links and global market clearing
Home economy is connected to foreign economy through relative prices of home to foreign com-
modities. The real exchange rate is st =
etP

t
Pt
reects the terms of trade at home qt =
PH;t
PF;t
and the
foreign economy qt =
PF;t
PH;t
. Pass-through is perfect when
 F;t
qt
=
 F;t
qt
:"
st =
etP

t
Pt
; qt =
PH;t
PF;t
; qt =
P F;t
P H;t
;
 F;t
qt
=
 F;t
qt
#
(27)
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Market clearing implies that domestic and foreign asset markets clear:

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1
= Qt;t+1 = 
t+1
t
P t
P t+1
et
et+1
(28)
Similarly markets also clear for home and foreign goods as:
YH;t = CH;t +GH;t + C

H;t (29)
Y F;t = C

F;t +G

F;t + CF;t (30)
4.3 Log-linearisation for the solution of the model
Model solved using Sim(2002) algorithm. First dene variables as:
ext = lnxt   lnx
Linearlisation of price (ination to marginal cost):
eH;t = EteH;t+1 + kH;tfmct (31)
where kH;t = 1 HH (1  H) is Calvo price adjustment factor and fmct =  et   aeqt   eAt is
marginal cost of production. Similarly the changes in the marginal utility of income
et relates
to changes in consumption between two periods are given by Euler relation:
 et = 
1  h
eCt   h
1  hEt
h
 eCt+1 + ezt+1i (32)
Habits evolves according to (for h = 0) it is a standard Euler equation):
(1  h) eCt = ect   hect+1 + hezt+1 (33)
 et =  Etet 1   h eRt   Etet 1i+ Etezt+1 (34)
Changes in the ination are due to the domestic and international factors (importers Phillips
curve):
eF;t = EteF;t+1 + kF;te F;t; kF;t = 1  II (1  I) (35)
This domestic ination has domestic and foreign components:
et = eF;t + (1  ) eH;t (36)
Terms of trade according to changes in domestic relative to foreign ination:
eqt = eqt 1 + eH;t   eF;t (37)
Thus the real exchange rate evolves according to the lop and terms of trade e¤ects as:
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est = e F;t   (1  ) eqt 1   eqt 1 (38)
Purchasing power parity condition implies that changes in the exchange rate reect the di¤erence
on changes in domestic and foreign ination and real exchange rates:
et = et   et + est (39)
Interest rate di¤erential relate to changes in the exchange rate dynamics as:
eRt   eRt = Etet+1 (40)
Marginal utilities of income between trading nations relate to purchasing power parity:
et = et   est (41)
goods market clearing:
eyH;t = ect   egt   

est +  (1  )  (eqt   eqt ) (42)
This output relates to aggregate demand and relative price from this condition.
Interest rate rule for this global economy includes adjustments to ination, output gap and
exchange rates and shocks to the monetary policy in the form of a Taylor equation as:
eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R) [ 1et +  2 (eyt + ezt) +  3et+1] + R;t (43)
Here R;t represents the monetary policy shock.
This global economy is subject to ve types of shocks. First three shocks represent productivity
shocks in the global market (ezt), home country  eAt and the foreign country  eAt : All three
productivity shocks are assumed to be autoregressive of order 1 ( z, A A) and subject to
random shocks z;t, A;t and A;t respectively. These shocks a¤ect both the consumption and
production sides of the economy.
ezt = zezt 1 + z;t (44)
eAt = A eAt 1 + A;t (45)
eAt = A eAt 1 + A;t (46)
Then the model is subject to two types of scal policy shocks, the aggregate public spending
shocks eGt and eGt respectively at home and abroad. Fiscal shocks are persistent with order 1
autoregression as measured by G and G but also subject to random uctuations G and G
eGt = G eGt 1 + G;t (47)
eGt = G eGt 1 + G;t (48)
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This model consists of six types of variables: 1) Prices: ePt; eP t ; ePH ; eP H ; ePI ; eP I ; et; et ; eQt; eQt (
PI , PI_star , PI_H ,PI_Hstar , PI_F , PI_Fstar , LAM , LAM_star , Q, Q_star) ; 2) Growth
and ination: eyH;t; eyH;t; eH ; eH ; eI ; eI ; (Ygr_US, Ygr_F, INF_US, INF_F); 3) Quantities: eCt;eCt ; calC ,calC_star, eYt; eY t ; 4) Interest rate and exchange rates: Rt; Rt , S , RUS;t; RIt (R_US,
R_F) , E_ (E_del); 5) exchange rate (ER) pass-through: e F;t and e F;t (PSI_F, PSI_Hstar)
and 6) shocks: At; At , Gt; G

t , Z:
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) applied this model to study interactions between the US and
Euro area and found it good to study the business cycle policy spillover e¤ects across nations. We
apply it to study interaction between the US and the Indian economy, particularly to see if this
model generates patterns as we observed in the structural VAR(1) earlier. This model is estimated
with time varying parameters based on the same quarterly data set from 1981:I to 2014:II as
presented in Figure 1 and used in VAR(1) analysis in the last section. Variables have 134 time
series observations on growth, ination and interest rate in India and the US and the real exchange
rate. This Bayesian DSGE VAR (BVAR) model is applied to estimate the time prole of model
parameters and for the various decomposition analysis. The next section presents the estimates of
correlation and autoregressions among variables, priors and posterior means and condence interval
of parameters along with their priors on their mean and standard deviations.
4.3.1 Correlation and autocorrelations
Correlations between pairs of seven model variables have expected signs except those with the
US ination. Positive correlation between growth rate and interest rate is indicative of increased
demand for money and more capital ows to a country which has higher growth rates. Ination in
the US is negatively related to growth rates as it brings uncertainty not only for the US but also
in the global economy. US growth rate is lower with depreciation of Indian currency but it raises
the growth rate in India as it can export more with such depreciation. Interest rates are higher
with higher growth rates and inations. Currency appreciates with higher growth rate abroad and
higher ination at home.
Table 1: Matrix Of Correlations
Variables Ygr_US INF_US R_US Ygr_F INF_F R_F E_del
Ygr_US 1 -0.0319 0.4775 0.2943 0.1877 0.4495 -0.2693
INF_US -0.0319 1 0.1133 -0.1084 0.2419 0.0688 0.0567
R_US 0.4775 0.1133 1 0.553 0.5146 0.9033 -0.0748
Ygr_F 0.2943 -0.1084 0.553 1 -0.0994 0.6377 0.2427
INF_F 0.1877 0.2419 0.5146 -0.0994 1 0.4548 -0.0154
R_F 0.4495 0.0688 0.9033 0.6377 0.4548 1 -0.066
E_del -0.2693 0.0567 -0.0748 0.2427 -0.0154 -0.066 1
Autocorrelations show persistency of variables. We report here only up to order of ve. All
variables are persistent but revert to their mean in the long run. Ination is most persistent of the
seven variables in the model followed by the interest rate and growth rates. Exchange rates are
random, cyclical and the least persistent as the auotcorrelation coe¢ cient is almost zero.
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Table 2: Coe¢ cients of Autocorrelation
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Ygr_US 0.1322 0.1289 0.107 0.088 0.0727
INF_US 0.9032 0.8679 0.8519 0.8425 0.8355
R_US 0.745 0.6148 0.5181 0.4404 0.3772
Ygr_F 0.248 0.2116 0.1584 0.1152 0.0819
INF_F 0.9546 0.9077 0.8612 0.816 0.7725
R_F 0.7687 0.6311 0.5246 0.4395 0.3716
E_del -0.0014 0.0011 0.0014 0.0013 0.0011
4.3.2 Prior and posterior estimations
According to An and Schorfeide (2007) the Bayesian estimation process involves search through
the space of  using appropriate size of steps. The Bayestheorem is used in order to get posterior
on parameter , p
 
jY T , which can be derived from the denition of conditional probability:
p
 
jY T  / p  Y T j p ()  |  jY T  where p  Y T j stands for maximum likelihood function
and p () stands for prior probability distributions, and |
 
jY T  stands for the posterior kernel.
Likelihood function is estimated with the help of the Kalman lter in the form of Metropolis-
Hestings MCMC) algorithm (estimated in the dynare). It generates time varying proles of model
parameters. The priors and posterior means along with the condence intervals of these model
parameters are given in Table 3.
4.3.3 Prior and posterior means of stochastic shocks
Major elements of uctuations in a DSGE model originate from shocks. This model contains eight
di¤erent shocks. Each country is subject to country specic technology, public spending and interest
rate shocks. Then there is a global technology shock and shocks to the changes in the exchange rates
between the US and India. Prior and posterior mean along with condence interval and standard
deviation of posterior density function are given in table 4. Each of these distributions is assumed
to have inverse gamma (invg) distribution on its prior.
In this context consider the modelling approach from the Dynare Guide (Chapter 8) "At its most
basic level, Bayesian estimation is a bridge between calibration and maximum likelihood. The tradition of
calibrating models is inherited through the specication of priors. And the maximum likelihood approach
enters through the estimation process based on confronting the model with data.
Together, priors can be seen as weights on the likelihood function in order to give more importance to
certain areas of the parameter subspace. More technically, these two building blocks - priors and likelihood
functions - are tied together by Bayesrule."
4.3.4 Policy transition functions
Policy transition functions show how endogenous variables relate to predetermined variables in the
model. Numbers in the 2nd and 4th column of Table 5 show the growth rates of output in the US
and India both move positively to consumption in the previous periods, technical innovations and
the growth in the public spending. However they react di¤erently to the lagged values of interest
rates or the exchange rates. There is a very striking resemblance for the coe¢ cients of the interest
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Table 3: Estimation of Parameters in open economy model
prior mean post. mean conf.interval prior pstdev
theta_H 0.5 0.9901 0.9896 0.9907 beta 0.15
theta_F 0.5 0.3655 0.3559 0.3727 beta 0.15
theta_Hstar 0.75 0.9985 0.9977 0.999 beta 0.15
theta_Fstar 0.75 0.9149 0.9082 0.9209 beta 0.15
tau 2 2.2585 2.2339 2.2928 gamma 0.5
h 0.3 0.1891 0.1868 0.1923 beta 0.1
alp 0.12 0.0323 0.0283 0.0369 beta 0.05
eta 1 0.7896 0.7473 0.8348 gamma 0.5
psi1 1.5 1.6074 1.5978 1.6196 gamma 0.25
psi2 0.5 1.3696 1.3545 1.3833 gamma 0.25
psi3 0.1 0.1075 0.1051 0.1109 gamma 0.05
psi1star 1.5 1.4688 1.4542 1.4863 gamma 0.25
psi2star 0.5 1.234 1.2118 1.2494 gamma 0.25
psi3star 0.1 0.0889 0.0866 0.0911 gamma 0.05
rhoA 0.8 0.8706 0.8639 0.8797 beta 0.10
rhoR 0.5 0.5255 0.5195 0.5316 beta 0.2
rhoG 0.8 0.9959 0.9955 0.9962 beta 0.1
rhoAstar 0.6 0.8783 0.871 0.8853 beta 0.2
rhoRstar 0.5 0.4553 0.4477 0.4665 beta 0.2
rhoGstar 0.8 0.9887 0.9869 0.991 beta 0.1
rhoZ 0.66 0.2335 0.2303 0.2367 beta 0.15
rr_steady 0.5 0.0251 0.0198 0.0299 gamma 0.5
gam_steady 0.4 0.0819 0.072 0.0912 norm 0.2
pi_steady 7 0.7091 0.6778 0.731 gamma 2
rates in India and the US indicating close integration in the capital markets. Ination also reacts
di¤erently between these two countries.
4.3.5 Theoretical Moments
There is striking similarity in the theoretical moment used in the model though it could be argued
that the mean quarterly growth rate of 0.095 seems about right for the US but it should be a bit
higher for India. Similarly ination rate in India is above 0.70 percent than used in this model.
Discrepancy between these theoretical moments and actual moments cause the reverse in the
patterns of responses to macroeconomic variables of six shocks as shown in the impulse response
functions in the next section.
4.3.6 Bayesian impulse response functions
Impulse responses of macro variables to shocks to domestic, foreign and global technologies and
public spending vary between the USA and India. For instance when global technology improves
responses of output, ination and interest rates are just opposite between the US and India. Output
and interest rates rise but ination falls in the US but just opposite occurs in case of India. Similarly
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Table 4: Standard deviation of shocks
prior mean post. mean conf. interval prior pstdev
EPS_A 1.253 2.2741 2.1925 2.343 invg 0.6551
EPS_G 1.253 0.2799 0.2756 0.2844 invg 0.6551
EPS_R 0.501 0.124 0.1221 0.1256 invg 0.2621
EPS_Astar 0.501 0.1323 0.1287 0.1389 invg 0.2621
EPS_Gstar 1.253 0.29 0.2848 0.2943 invg 0.6551
EPS_Rstar 0.251 0.056 0.0551 0.0571 invg 0.131
EPS_Z 0.627 0.1413 0.1378 0.1455 invg 0.3276
EPS_Edel 4.387 0.9788 0.9646 0.9907 invg 2.293
when interest increase in India ination falls in India but rises in the US as it lowers the US interest
rate. Increase of interest in India leads to an increase in output in the US.
Figure 6: Responses of macro variables to technology and exchange rate shocks
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Table 5: Policy And Transition Functions
Ygr_US INF_US R_US Ygr_F INF_F R_F E_del
Constant 0.095353 0.704263 1.108322 0.095353 0.704263 1.108322 0
C(-1) 0.19448 0.00023 0.468766 0.029578 -0.00517 0.080452 -0.03671
C_star(-1) 0.001329 0.000327 0.010283 0.16372 0.02227 0.440648 0.035793
R(-1) -0.38763 -0.07275 1.014496 0.244222 0.103109 0.880421 -0.83278
R_star(-1) -0.01231 0.048023 0.122758 -0.46012 -0.16627 0.374699 0.620458
Y(-1) -0.56391 0.081842 -1.14133 -0.27476 -0.116 -0.99049 0.936898
Y_star(-1) 0.017631 -0.0688 -0.17588 -0.34079 0.238218 -0.53684 -0.88894
Q(-1) -0.02688 0.086012 -0.00345 0.014109 0.007064 0.043191 -0.00286
Q_star(-1) 0.017621 -0.00166 0.031195 0.003737 0.001483 0.021625 -0.05628
A(-1) 0.001392 -0.00241 0.001747 0.000376 0.000052 0.000925 0.000543
A_star(-1) -0.00143 -0.00799 -0.0136 0.053015 -0.15656 0.018803 -0.02247
G(-1) 0.599105 -0.04913 1.255879 0.28628 0.176204 1.064071 -0.91268
G_star(-1) 0.004119 0.074741 0.226778 0.35224 -0.11231 0.673687 0.854058
S(-1) 0.032583 0.011308 -0.07593 -0.0688 -0.02616 -0.03823 -0.86326
Z(-1) 0.075082 -0.00431 0.177696 0.097544 -0.04454 0.223314 -0.01453
EPS_R -0.71334 -0.13388 1.866959 0.449437 0.18975 1.620224 -1.53256
EPS_Rstar -0.02687 0.104861 0.268047 -1.00469 -0.36306 0.818175 1.354803
EPS_A 0.001601 -0.00277 0.00201 0.000432 0.000059 0.001064 0.000624
EPS_Astar -0.00162 -0.00905 -0.0154 0.060022 -0.17725 0.021288 -0.02543
EPS_G 0.601645 -0.04934 1.261204 0.287494 0.176951 1.068583 -0.91655
EPS_Gstar 0.004168 0.075622 0.229452 0.356393 -0.11363 0.68163 0.864128
EPS_Z 0.312484 -0.01793 0.739553 0.405969 -0.18536 0.92941 -0.06046
EPS_Edel -0.03258 -0.01131 0.075934 0.0688 0.026159 0.038231 0.863256
Figure 7: Responses of macro variables to scal and monetary policy shocks
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Table 6: Theoretical Moments
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance
Ygr_US 0.0954 0.206 0.0424
INF_US 0.7043 0.0994 0.0099
R_US 1.1083 0.6807 0.4634
Ygr_F 0.0954 0.1926 0.0371
INF_F 0.7043 0.2759 0.0761
R_F 1.1083 0.6917 0.4785
E_del 0 0.9315 0.8677
Increase in public spending raises output. Appreciation of exchange rates in India raises output
in the US and lowers it in India. Technology shocks at home and abroad raise output in the short
run in both in India and the US.
4.3.7 Variance Decomposition Analysis
The variance decompositions in a VAR or DSGE-BVAR model imply nding the proportions of
variances explained by shocks to the variable itself versus from the shocks to the other variables.
For instance variance in the growth rate of the US is caused by its own monetary, scal policy and
technology shocks and other shocks Rt, At; Gt as well as corresponding shocks of foreign country
Rt, 

At; 

Gt and the global policy shock z. The variance decompositions for the DSGE model are
presented in Table 7. It is clear that nearly 67% of the variation in the US growth rate is explained
by its public spending shocks. Then 18.2, 7.8 and 6.5 percents are explained by the shocks to
the global technology, monetary policy and domestic technology. Increase in the Indias public
spending plays prominent role its growth rate similarly. It explains nearly 64 percent of variations
on it. The global technology and the US monetary policy changes are also important in explaining
these growth rates. Variance decomposition also shows that the variances in the domestic and
foreign interest rates are more due to their own shocks as is the case for the real exchange rates.
Table 7: Variance decomposition
EPS_R EPS_Rstar EPS_A EPS_Astar EPS_G EPS_Gstar EPS_Z EPS_Edel
Ygr_US 7.77 0 6.47 0.01 67.44 0 18.16 0.16
INF_US 90.74 0 4.24 0.04 1.94 0 0.73 2.31
R_US 93.06 0.02 2.39 0.05 2.01 0.05 0.79 1.64
Ygr_F 10.21 0.27 4.9 3.17 0.22 63.9 14.92 2.41
INF_F 5.45 8.62 13.11 5.83 0.12 25.36 6.97 34.55
R_F 63.85 4.1 3.23 3.19 1.36 12.29 4.1 7.9
E_del 17.79 0.33 4.2 0.61 0.38 0.98 0.03 75.68
The time prole of these variances are more accurately shown in the series of diagrams. These
decompositions are comparable to those estimated from the VAR(1) model as the decomposition
are of similar magnitude in SVAR(1) as presented in the appendix and this table for growth rate
of the US economy (details of the Variance decomposition is available upon request).
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Variance decompositions of growth rates
For the growth rates of the US For the growth rates of India
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
EPS_R
EPS_Rstar
EPS_A
EPS_Astar
EPS_G
EPS_Gstar
EPS_Z
EPS_Edel
Initial values
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
EPS_R
EPS_Rstar
EPS_A
EPS_Astar
EPS_G
EPS_Gstar
EPS_Z
EPS_Edel
Initial values
Variance Decomposition of Ination
Ination in the US Ination in India
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
EPS_R
EPS_Rstar
EPS_A
EPS_Astar
EPS_G
EPS_Gstar
EPS_Z
EPS_Edel
Initial values
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
EPS_R
EPS_Rstar
EPS_A
EPS_Astar
EPS_G
EPS_Gstar
EPS_Z
EPS_Edel
Initial values
22
Variance Decomposition of the interest rate rates
For the interest rate in the US For the interest rate in India
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5 Economic growth among BRICS, EU and USA
Now we extend VAR model to China, India, Germany, UK and the US for strategic analysis
of macroeconomic policy coordination and interdependence estimated using the quarterly growth
rates of these countries. Results show persistency as well as conditional dependencies among these
economies. Estimates show that there is considerable growth competition among these countries.
Indias growth is inuenced much by its fundamentals but slows down a bit when China, Germany,
UK or US grow. In contrast China is able to absorb foreign growth to its benet except that it
competes on growth with the Germany. Germanys growth is more determined by its fundamentals
and that of the US. Higher growth rates in other countries seem to lower it. Growth rates in the
UK are positively related to the growth rates of Germany and the US but not related particularly
to the growth rates of India and China. US growth seems to be linked to that of India, UK and
the US itself. Impulse responses around the average growth rates are compared across countries.
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Let us consider the empirical evidence for the above model based on quarterly time series data
for these ve countries on the basis of the estimations of a system of ve regression equation in
which growth rate of one country depends on the growth of all other countries. These results are
as given in table 8.
Table 8: Interdependence in Economic Growth between US, EU and BRIC Countries
U SG R E U G R JP G R C H G R IN G R B RG R RU G R
U SG R _ 1 0 .9 0 3 ( 1 0 .1 ) 0 .2 2 2 ( 1 .0 6 ) 0 .3 2 3 ( 1 .8 1 ) - 0 .1 5 3 ( - 1 .3 9 ) - 0 .2 0 3 ( - 1 .2 6 ) 0 .0 0 4 ( 0 .0 2 ) 0 .1 8 4 ( 0 .5 8 )
E U G R _ 1 -0 .0 4 9 ( - 0 .4 5 ) 0 .3 8 8 ( 1 .5 4 ) - 0 .2 4 1 ( - 1 .2 2 ) 0 .1 1 8 ( 0 .8 9 ) 0 .1 6 7 ( 0 .8 6 ) - 0 .0 4 6 ( - 0 .2 0 ) - 0 .3 5 8 ( - 0 .9 4 )
J P G R _ 1 0 .1 8 7 ( 1 .9 1 ) 0 .5 3 8 ( 2 .3 4 ) 0 .6 8 2 ( 3 .4 8 ) 0 .1 5 3 ( 1 .2 7 ) - 0 .0 2 3 ( - 0 .1 3 ) 0 .0 8 4 ( 0 .4 0 ) 0 .8 8 0 ( 2 .5 4 )
C H G R _ 1 0 .0 7 1 ( 0 .7 9 ) 0 .5 4 3 ( 2 .5 9 ) 0 .1 9 4 ( 1 .0 9 ) 0 .6 4 5 ( 5 .8 4 ) 0 .1 3 8 ( 0 .8 5 ) 0 .0 2 7 ( 0 .1 8 ) 0 .7 9 8 ( 2 .5 2 )
IN G R _ 1 0 .0 7 2 ( 1 .0 7 ) - 0 .0 5 2 ( - 0 .3 4 ) 0 .1 6 7 ( 1 .2 4 ) 0 .2 5 1 ( 3 .0 1 ) 0 .5 6 2 ( 4 .6 0 ) 0 .4 7 9 ( 3 .1 1 ) - 0 .1 9 3 ( - 0 .8 1 )
B RG R _ 1 -0 .1 3 5 ( - 1 .9 1 ) - 0 .3 5 6 ( - 2 .1 4 ) - 0 .0 3 1 ( - 0 .2 2 ) - 0 .0 9 5 ( - 1 .0 8 ) - 0 .0 5 2 ( - 0 .4 0 ) 0 .4 7 9 ( 3 .1 1 ) - 0 .5 4 3 ( - 2 .1 6 )
RU G R _ 1 -0 .4 9 9 ( - 0 .7 6 ) 0 .0 8 6 ( - 0 .5 6 ) 0 .1 1 7 ( 0 .8 8 ) - 0 .0 9 5 ( - 1 .1 7 ) - 0 .0 7 7 ( - 0 .6 4 ) 0 .0 6 0 ( 0 .4 2 ) 0 .7 1 9 ( 3 .0 8 )
C o n s t a n t - 0 .2 7 0 ( - 0 .3 6 ) - 2 .3 2 3 ( - 1 .2 8 ) - 2 .3 2 2 ( - 1 .2 8 ) 2 .1 1 9 ( 2 .2 2 ) 2 .1 3 7 ( 1 .5 3 ) - 2 .6 7 5 ( - 1 .6 0 ) - 2 .7 0 6 ( - 0 .9 9 )
R S q (A d j ) 0 .8 4 0 .7 5 0 .6 1 0 .7 1 0 .4 5 0 .5 5 0 .6 9
F - s t a t 4 5 .9 2 4 .9 1 3 .5 2 0 .7 7 .6 1 0 .7 1 8 .7
T -va lu e s a r e in t h e p a r e n t h e s e s .
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Impulse Responses in Growth between US, EU and BRIC Countries
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We also compare the growth complementarities among four BRIC countries in Table 9. Higher
growth in China, India and Russia seem to raise growth in Brazil but higher growth rate in Brazil
seem to lower the growth rates in all other three countries. This is very surprising. Growth rates
in Russia does not help growths in China and India where their growth rates seem to be very
complementary to themselves. Higher growth in India and China go together.
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Table 9: Rich Country Growth Club
USGR EUGR JPGR CHGR
USGR_1 0.961(12.8) 0.287 (1.06) 0.242 (1.67) -0.103(-1.06)
EUGR_1 -0.103(-2.39) 0.617(1.54) -0.046(-0.55) -0.038(-0.68)
JPGR_1 0.045(0.57) 0.130(2.34) 0.624(4.13) 0.067(0.66)
CHGR_1 0.085(1.19) 0.336(2.59) 0.235(1.70) 0.813(8.73)
Constant -0.401(-0.54) -2.425(-1.32) -2.473(-1.72) 2.147(2.21)
RSq (Adj) 0.84 0.71 0.61 0.65
F-stat 77.1 37.4 23.9 28.3
T-values are in the parentheses.
Table 10: BRIC Country Growth Club
CHGR INGR BRGR RUGR
CHGR_1 0.679(6.35) 0.170(1.08) 0.409(2.23) 0.790(2.34)
INGR_1 0.272(3.36) 0.597(5.02) 0.025(0.18) -0.247(-0.97)
BRGR_1 -0.014(-0.21) -0.034(-0.33) 0.504(4.19) -0.255(-1.15)
RUGR_1 -0.009(-0.31) -0.013(-0.30) 0.053(1.03) 0.750(7.88)
Constant 1.225(1.62) 1.440(1.30) -2.820(-2.17) -3.822(-1.60)
RSq (Adj) 0.71 0.45 0.57 0.62
F-stat 35.9 12.6 19.7 24.3
T-values are in the parentheses.
Policies of once country thus can have impact on growth in other countries. In addition to
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) style business cycle model analysis of trade and capital mobility
and relating policies requires a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium problem in tradition of
Ricardian comparative advantage, Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor price equalisation theorem or
Krugman-Venable-Eaton Kharum type increasing returns to scales. Whalley (1985), Bhagwati
(1992) and Bhattarai and Mallick (2013) structure of dynamic general equilibrium model thus can
be extended for policy coordination. Leontie¤s dynamic input out model (Chakravarty (1965), and
Eckaus and Parikh (1968)) and Bhattarai, Haughton and Tuerck (2015) model of the US economy
could be extended further for such analysis in the future.
6 Conclusion
Impulse response and variance decomposition estimations are similar in traditional VAR (1) and
BVAR-DSGE models but the later model can provide theoretical and structural reasons behind
those estimations. In the context of growth competition and spill over e¤ects of policies, it is
important to quantify such positive or complementary impacts from negative or competitive impacts
so that appropriate actions could be taken for policy coordination. Cooperative mechanism should
be structured based on these analysis and evaluation of likely scenarios in coming years. First two
models in this paper illustrated how interactions and interdependence could be studied using VAR
and BVAR-DSGE models of India and the US. Then strategic macroeconomic policy coordination
and interdependence were studied strategically with VAR models of China, India, Germany, UK
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and the US estimated using the quarterly time series of growth rates.
Persistency and conditional dependencies are observed and uctuations around the average
growth rates are compared across countries. Estimates show that there is a considerable growth
competition among these countries. Indias growth is inuenced much by its fundamentals but
slows down a bit when China, Germany, UK or US grow. In contrast China is able to absorb
foreign growth to its benet except that it competes with Germany. Germanys growth is more
determined by its fundamentals and that of the US. Higher growth rates in other countries seem to
lower it. Growth rate in the UK are positively related to the growth of Germany, UK and US but
not related to that of India and China. The US growth rate are positively linked to that of India,
the UK and the US growth itself.
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A Appendix: Some estimated results of VAR(1) model
Table 11: Variance decomposition in the VAR(1) model for policy coordinationl
Period S.E. E_DEL INF_F INF_US R_F R_US YGR_F YGR_US
1 0.0096 3.2353 2.1899 0.3527 4.5702 7.6911 0.0000 81.9607
2 0.0130 4.6646 3.9071 0.2175 4.5417 7.8890 0.0083 78.7719
3 0.0152 5.1744 5.7482 0.1658 4.5629 8.1618 0.0194 76.1675
4 0.0166 5.3071 7.5854 0.1851 4.6265 8.4145 0.0291 73.8523
5 0.0176 5.2853 9.3307 0.2582 4.7218 8.6180 0.0364 71.7496
6 0.0183 5.2018 10.9266 0.3679 4.8393 8.7675 0.0412 69.8557
7 0.0188 5.0985 12.3386 0.4983 4.9707 8.8674 0.0441 68.1824
8 0.0191 4.9956 13.5514 0.6356 5.1087 8.9253 0.0458 66.7375
9 0.0193 4.9030 14.5647 0.7687 5.2478 8.9499 0.0467 65.5192
10 0.0195 4.8251 15.3896 0.8896 5.3836 8.9494 0.0471 64.5155
11 0.0196 4.7629 16.0456 0.9931 5.5134 8.9314 0.0472 63.7064
12 0.0197 4.7157 16.5562 1.0769 5.6356 8.9022 0.0471 63.0662
13 0.0198 4.6815 16.9468 1.1411 5.7496 8.8668 0.0469 62.5674
14 0.0199 4.6580 17.2417 1.1871 5.8554 8.8289 0.0467 62.1823
15 0.0199 4.6427 17.4627 1.2177 5.9537 8.7910 0.0464 61.8857
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Table 12: Estimation of parameters in a VAR mode for policy coordinationl
E _ D E L IN F_ F IN F_ U S R _ F R _ U S Y G R _ F Y G R _ U S
E _ D E L ( -1 ) 0 .2 3 1 6 0 .0 0 5 0 0 .0 0 2 9 - 0 .0 0 2 2 - 0 .0 2 5 3 - 0 .0 5 1 2 - 0 .0 2 3 6
- 0 .0 8 9 0 - 0 .0 4 2 1 - 0 .0 0 5 9 - 0 .0 1 2 2 - 0 .0 1 7 5 - 0 .0 2 9 0 - 0 .0 2 3 9
[ 2 .6 0 1 2 9 ] [ 0 .1 1 8 1 4 ] [ 0 .4 8 7 1 9 ] [ - 0 .1 7 8 0 7 ] [ - 1 .4 4 2 8 9 ] [ - 1 .7 6 7 6 3 ] [ - 0 .9 8 7 9 4 ]
IN F _ F ( -1 ) 0 .0 1 6 8 0 .7 9 6 4 0 .0 0 4 7 0 .0 4 7 5 - 0 .0 0 4 8 - 0 .0 0 4 2 0 .0 5 3 3
- 0 .1 2 5 7 - 0 .0 5 9 5 - 0 .0 0 8 3 - 0 .0 1 7 2 - 0 .0 2 4 8 - 0 .0 4 0 9 - 0 .0 3 3 7
[ 0 .1 3 3 6 9 ] [ 1 3 .3 9 6 2 ] [ 0 .5 6 5 5 3 ] [ 2 .7 7 0 4 4 ] [ - 0 .1 9 5 4 0 ] [ - 0 .1 0 2 0 6 ] [ 1 .5 8 0 0 7 ]
IN F _ U S ( - 1 ) 0 .4 5 2 9 - 0 .0 6 1 2 0 .9 1 9 5 0 .0 0 5 4 0 .2 1 1 0 0 .0 2 8 9 - 0 .1 3 2 2
- 0 .3 6 1 2 - 0 .1 7 0 8 - 0 .0 2 3 8 - 0 .0 4 9 3 - 0 .0 7 1 1 - 0 .1 1 7 6 - 0 .0 9 6 8
[ 1 .2 5 3 9 2 ] [ - 0 .3 5 8 2 6 ] [ 3 8 .7 1 8 1 ] [ 0 .1 0 9 6 5 ] [ 2 .9 6 7 5 1 ] [ 0 .2 4 5 8 3 ] [ - 1 .3 6 5 1 1 ]
R _ F ( -1 ) 0 .3 6 0 5 0 .0 9 9 0 - 0 .0 2 0 2 0 .9 0 5 1 0 .1 2 0 5 - 0 .0 5 2 5 0 .0 0 5 9
- 0 .2 6 0 0 - 0 .1 2 2 9 - 0 .0 1 7 1 - 0 .0 3 5 5 - 0 .0 5 1 2 - 0 .0 8 4 6 - 0 .0 6 9 7
[ 1 .3 8 6 8 5 ] [ 0 .8 0 5 5 8 ] [ - 1 .1 8 0 8 2 ] [ 2 5 .5 0 6 4 ] [ 2 .3 5 5 1 9 ] [ - 0 .6 1 9 9 5 ] [ 0 .0 8 4 4 0 ]
R _ U S ( - 1 ) - 0 .3 0 7 1 0 .0 0 4 4 0 .0 0 2 6 0 .0 5 3 1 0 .7 8 7 3 - 0 .0 4 0 0 0 .0 2 8 4
- 0 .2 7 2 8 - 0 .1 2 9 0 - 0 .0 1 7 9 - 0 .0 3 7 2 - 0 .0 5 3 7 - 0 .0 8 8 8 - 0 .0 7 3 1
[ - 1 .1 2 5 9 3 ] [ 0 .0 3 3 9 3 ] [ 0 .1 4 4 4 0 ] [ 1 .4 2 5 4 2 ] [ 1 4 .6 6 1 3 ] [ - 0 .4 5 0 4 3 ] [ 0 .3 8 7 9 4 ]
Y G R _ F ( -1 ) - 0 .0 1 6 6 0 .0 0 5 4 0 .0 1 2 1 - 0 .0 1 7 0 0 .0 9 0 5 0 .7 4 9 4 - 0 .0 1 0 8
- 0 .1 9 0 9 - 0 .0 9 0 3 - 0 .0 1 2 6 - 0 .0 2 6 1 - 0 .0 3 7 6 - 0 .0 6 2 2 - 0 .0 5 1 2
[ - 0 .0 8 7 0 9 ] [ 0 .0 6 0 1 8 ] [ 0 .9 6 3 4 1 ] [ - 0 .6 5 1 0 1 ] [ 2 .4 0 8 1 7 ] [ 1 2 .0 5 6 9 ] [ - 0 .2 1 0 8 7 ]
Y G R _ U S ( - 1 ) 0 .0 4 4 0 - 0 .2 4 4 2 0 .0 5 9 6 0 .0 2 7 6 0 .0 9 7 3 0 .0 4 8 9 0 .8 7 2 3
- 0 .1 8 1 5 - 0 .0 8 5 8 - 0 .0 1 1 9 - 0 .0 2 4 8 - 0 .0 3 5 7 - 0 .0 5 9 1 - 0 .0 4 8 7
[ 0 .2 4 2 1 5 ] [ - 2 .8 4 4 8 3 ] [ 4 .9 9 3 1 8 ] [ 1 .1 1 2 9 0 ] [ 2 .7 2 2 6 7 ] [ 0 .8 2 6 9 2 ] [ 1 7 .9 2 4 5 ]
C -0 .0 2 7 8 0 .0 1 3 2 0 .0 0 0 8 0 .0 0 3 9 - 0 .0 1 7 7 0 .0 2 2 1 0 .0 0 1 8
- 0 .0 2 5 9 - 0 .0 1 2 3 - 0 .0 0 1 7 - 0 .0 0 3 5 - 0 .0 0 5 1 - 0 .0 0 8 4 - 0 .0 0 6 9
[ - 1 .0 7 2 3 4 ] [ 1 .0 7 8 7 7 ] [ 0 .4 9 1 0 7 ] [ 1 .0 9 5 6 1 ] [ - 3 .4 7 7 1 0 ] [ 2 .6 2 5 2 5 ] [ 0 .2 6 4 7 5 ]
R - s q u a r e d 0 .1 4 0 4 0 .7 4 7 2 0 .9 7 5 6 0 .9 7 6 8 0 .9 5 6 3 0 .6 9 3 1 0 .8 0 0 4
A d j . R - s q u a r e d 0 .0 9 2 3 0 .7 3 3 0 0 .9 7 4 2 0 .9 7 5 5 0 .9 5 3 8 0 .6 7 5 9 0 .7 8 9 2
S um sq . r e s id s 0 .1 6 0 5 0 .0 3 5 9 0 .0 0 0 7 0 .0 0 3 0 0 .0 0 6 2 0 .0 1 7 0 0 .0 1 1 5
S .E . e q u a t io n 0 .0 3 5 8 0 .0 1 6 9 0 .0 0 2 4 0 .0 0 4 9 0 .0 0 7 1 0 .0 1 1 7 0 .0 0 9 6
F - s t a t i s t i c 2 .9 1 6 9 5 2 .7 7 0 3 7 1 4 .1 0 8 9 7 5 0 .4 1 9 9 3 9 0 .3 6 9 7 4 0 .3 3 1 5 7 1 .5 9 0 4
L o g l ik e l ih o o d 2 5 8 .1 3 4 8 3 5 7 .7 4 7 2 6 2 0 .1 3 5 5 5 2 3 .0 0 0 9 4 7 4 .2 9 1 9 4 0 7 .3 7 5 5 4 3 3 .1 9 7 9
A ka ik e A IC -3 .7 6 1 4 - 5 .2 5 9 4 - 9 .2 0 5 0 - 7 .7 4 4 4 - 7 .0 1 1 9 - 6 .0 0 5 6 - 6 .3 9 4 0
S chw a r z S C -3 .5 8 7 6 - 5 .0 8 5 5 - 9 .0 3 1 2 - 7 .5 7 0 5 - 6 .8 3 8 1 - 5 .8 3 1 8 - 6 .2 2 0 1
M e a n d e p e n d e n t 0 .0 1 5 8 0 .0 8 2 4 0 .0 2 6 3 0 .1 1 0 6 0 .0 4 5 0 0 .0 6 1 8 0 .0 2 7 6
S .D . d e p e n d e n t 0 .0 3 7 6 0 .0 3 2 8 0 .0 1 4 7 0 .0 3 1 2 0 .0 3 2 8 0 .0 2 0 5 0 .0 2 0 9
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